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Under its avoidance powers, a trustee can undo fraudulent transfers made within a certain
period of time before the bankruptcy petition date and return and redistribute the value of such
transactions to the bankruptcy estate. Section 550 specifies that “…the trustee may recover, for
the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such
property, from the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made.”4 For a trustee to recovery property transferred by the debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code, the transfer must first be avoided under Section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b) or
724(a).5 This memorandum discusses the recovery of property from fraudulent transfers and
obligations avoided by a trustee through Section 548.
Section 550(a)(1) places strict liability on initial transferees for fraudulent transfers
received from a debtor.6 Conversely, Section 550(b) prevents recovery from a good faith
subsequent transferee.7 However, regardless of good faith, if an accused party is found to be an
initial transferee, they are held liable to the bankruptcy estate for the entire amount of the
fraudulent transfer. Therefore, the identification of an initial transferee is necessary for
determining the scope of a trustee’s avoidance power under the Bankruptcy Code.
Since the Bankruptcy Code does not define “initial transferee,” courts are tasked with
developing their own interpretation for the term. This memorandum begins by addressing the
Seventh Circuit’s legal dominion test, the leading standard used for defining “initial transferee.”
Next, it addresses the various approaches circuit courts have developed as a result of the Seventh
Circuit’s standard. The “dominion test” is a strict approach of the legal dominion standard, where

4

11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1).
Id.
6
See Christy v. Alexander & Alexander Inc. (In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson &
Casey), 130 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1997).
7
11 U.S.C. § 550(a)-(b).
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an initial transferee is defined as a party with legal authority over funds. To the contrary, the
“control test” uses a holistic approach to determine whether a party controlled the funds in
question. Lastly, this memorandum discusses the mere conduit test and how it is used as a
defense for initial transferee liability.
Discussion
I. Establishing the Standard
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a definition nor useful legislative history for the
term “initial transferee”. Likewise, courts have held that a literal reading of Section 550(a) leads
to inequitable results because it allows trustees to recover from parties who are innocent of
wrongdoing.8 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit developed the following standard for determining
whether a party was an initial transferee: “the minimum requirement of status as a ‘transferee’ is
dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.” 9
Thus, a party exercises dominion when they can invest funds freely.10 Also, an agent does not
exercise dominion over funds when it follows the instructions of its principal. 11 For example, the
Seventh Circuit found a bank was not an initial transferee when instructed by a currency
exchange to deposit $200,000 into their principal’s bank account because the bank acted as a
“financial intermediary”, “received no benefit”, and “held the check only for the purpose of

8

See, e.g., Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(rejecting the literal reading of the rule where a law firm acted as a “mere conduit” and not an initial transferee for
funds funneled through its escrow account for business dealings with their client’s debtor); In re Colombia Coffee
Co., 75 B.R. 177, 179–80 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (exercising equitable discretion in rejecting the literal reading of Section
550(a) in determining a bank was not an initial transferee because it possessed no discretion with respect to the
disposition of the funds).
9
Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
10
See id. at 894 (emphasizing an entity has legal dominion over the money when it is free to invest that money in
“lottery tickets or uranium stocks”).
11
See Taunt v. Hurtado (In re Hurtado), 342 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893).
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fulfilling an instruction to make the funds available to someone else.”12 Furthermore, courts have
clarified that the term “transferee” is not self-defining and holds a greater meaning than “anyone
who touches the money” under Section 550(a), because it diverges from being labeled as a
“possessor”, “holder”, or “agent”. 13
The Seventh Circuit’s framework for defining “initial transferees” is preeminent and has
been adopted in various iterations among the circuit courts.14 Accordingly, the following
approaches have been adopted: (1) the “dominion test”; (2) the “control test”; (3) a combination
of the “dominion test” and/or “control test”; and (4) the mere conduit test.
II. The “Dominion Test”, “Control Test”, and “Dominion and/or Control Test”
The “dominion test” and “control test” are two significant tests developed to determine
whether a party is an initial transferee. Although the words ‘dominion’ and ‘control’ are
synonymous, the Ninth Circuit explained that the “dominion test” and the “control test” are not
merely different names for the same inquiry.15
Under the dominion test, courts focus on “whether an entity had legal authority over the
money and the right to use the money however it wished” when defining “initial transferee”. 16
When a party can invest funds as they see fit, they are considered an initial transferee.17
Similarly, other circuits have determined that principals who direct debtor corporations to issue
certified checks to pay personal debts are not initial transferees because those principals did not

See Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893 (articulating the bank was “no different from a courier or an intermediary
on a wire transfer”).
13
Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 894).
14
In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
15
Universal Serv. Admin. Co. v. Post-Confirmation Comm. (In re Incomnet, Inc.), 463 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding the two inquiries are not identical despite facial similarities).
16
See id. at 1070 (quoting Abele v. Mod. Fin. Plans Servs. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006)).
17
In re Incomnet, Inc., 463 F.3d at 1070 (explaining that banks performing ordinary bank deposits are not initial
transferees because “the bank will initially take title over the depositor’s funds, but it will not have dominion over
them because it has no discretion over the uses to which the depositor’s money is to be put. Thus, the bank is not the
transferee, but the conduit or agent for a general deposit”).
12
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have the ability to use the funds as they wished. 18 In addition, “[t]he first party to establish
dominion over the funds after they leave the transferor is the initial transferee; other transferees
are subsequent transferor.”19 Thus, courts acknowledge that defining the term “initial transferee”
is a meaningful inquiry because a party with such status lacks affirmative defenses that would
otherwise be available to a subsequent transferee. 20
The control test takes a different approach. The control test views an entire transaction
holistically to determine which party controlled the transferred funds when defining an initial
transferee.21 The control test is very flexible and pragmatic; it requires courts to “look beyond the
particular transfers in question to the entire circumstance of the transactions.”22 Courts applying
this test cautiously study the transaction from a broader perspective to ensure their conclusions
are logical and equitable.23 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held a bank that received money for
deposit into its customer’s account to be used to reduce the customer’s indebtedness to the bank
was not an initial transferee because the bank never had actual control of the funds. 24

18

Schafer v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp. (In re Video Depot), 127 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling the principal of a
bankrupt corporation was not an initial transferee because the principal never actually received funds when using
funds of the corporation to purchase a certified check to pay its president’s gambling debt to defendant); In re
Coutee, 984 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding a law firm was not an initial transferee because the firm’s
role regarding the funds in question was to accept the funds in settlement of its client’s case, deposit the money in a
trust, retain fees preapproved by the debtors, and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the debtors of their loan).
19
Mano-Y&M Ltd. v. Field (In re Mortgage Store), 773 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). See In re Cohen, 300 F.3d at
1107 (finding a financing agency was an initial transferee when a debtor purchased a cashier’s check to pay a debt
owed by her husband to the agency because it was the first party to exercise “dominion” over the check).
20
See In re Mortgage Store, 773 F.3d at 994 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1)).
21
See In re Incomnet, Inc., 463 F.3d at 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 1988)) (finding the outcome of trustees seeking recovery of funds
allegedly fraudulent transferred from banks revolves around whether the bank in question controlled the funds).
22
In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 848 F.2d at 1196 (quoting In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 813 F.2d 1177, 1181–82
(11th Cir. 1987)) (concluding where a transfer to a non-creditor is disputed as fraudulent, “more is necessary to
establish the debtor’s control over the funds than the simple fact that a third party placed the funds in an account of
the debtor with no express restrictions on their use”).
23
See In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am, 922 F.2d 544, 549 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.,
848 F.2d at 1199).
24
In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 848 F.2d at 1200 (holding inequitable results will result from allowing recovery
against an entity that never controlled the funds it had technically received).
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In addition to the “dominion test” and “control test,” some circuits have combined the
names of the two when developing their framework, creating either the “dominion and control
test” or “dominion or control test”.25 Both the Tenth and Fourth Circuits have adopted the
“dominion and control test” while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits follow the “dominion or control
test”.26 The remaining circuits have yet to address the definition of an initial transferee.
III. The Mere Conduit Test
In formulating its definition of an initial transferee, the Second Circuit established the
mere conduit test, in which the circuit’s standard construes the dominion test and the control test
negatively.27 The mere conduit test is used as an equitable defense to shield mere conduits of
funds from initial transferee status.28 Under this test, parties who merely facilitated the transfer of
funds from the debtor to a third party are not initial transferees because they do not exercise
sufficient dominion and control. 29 Courts that follow the mere conduit test have distinguished the
term “initial transferee” as referencing something more particular than an initial recipient.30 As a
result, the mere conduit test was applied, adding further meaning to the definition of an initial

25

See In re Incomnent, Inc., 463 F.3d at 1064.
Compare Bailey v. Big Sky Motors (In re Ogden), 314 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002), and Bowers v. Atlanta
Motor Speedway (In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd. Pshp), 99 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1996), with In re Coutee, 984 F.2d
138, 140–41 (5th Cir. 1993), and First Nat’l Bank v. Rafoth (In re Banker & Getty Fin. Servs.), 974 F.2d 712, 722
(6th Cir. 1992).
27
See In re Finley, 130 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1997).
28
See Hooker Atlanta Corp. v. Hocker, 155 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
29
See In re Finley, 130 F.3d at 58–59 (holding an insurance broker’s business acted as a mere conduit through its
business relationships with a law firm because the insurance broker did not have the right to put insurance premium
to its own use).
30
See e.g., In re Finley, 130 F.3d at 56; Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936 at 940 (finding a principal stockholder was
not an initial transferee because he was simply a "courier" of check from debtor to principal's creditor, where his
control over funds was limited before the transfer occurred); Malloy v. Citizens Bank (In re First Security Mortgage
Co.), 33 F.3d 42 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding a bank was not an initial transferee when its mere purpose was to fulfill
instructions “to make the funds available to someone else”) (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893); Security
First Nat'l Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee), 984 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a law firm holding funds in
trust account was not an initial transferee because the firm lacked the requisite dominion necessary. Here, the law
firm’s role consisted of accepting the funds in settlement of its client’s case, depositing the money in the trust,
keeping fees the debtor and firm agreed to, and paying the remainder to the bank on behalf of the debtor in
satisfaction of their loan).
26
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transferee, where “a commercial entity that, in the ordinary course of its business, acts as a mere
conduit for funds and performs that role consistent with its contractual undertaking in respect of
the challenged transaction, is not an initial transferee within the meaning of § 550(a)(1).”31
Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Code allows trustees to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers from
initial transferees, holding such parties liable for funds received from a debtor. However, because
the Bankruptcy Code does not define “initial transferee”, courts are required to interpret and
apply standards for the term’s meaning. Legal dominion has long been recognized as the leading
standard for determining an initial transferee. However, some circuits have adopted their own
restatement of this approach. For example, the “dominion test” was created, where the focus is
on an entity’s legal status over the funds, and under the “control test”, courts look to a party’s
control over funds throughout the entire transaction. Also, several circuits have aligned their
interests somewhere in the middle of these two tests and use a hybrid approach toward defining
“initial transferee”. Lastly, the mere conduit test has grown into a defense to protect mere
conduits from initial transferee status. Because Section 550(a) places strict liability on an “initial
transferee”, thereby allowing a trustee to implement its avoidance powers, a court’s choice of
which test it applies is critical.

31

In re Finley, 130 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1997).
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